Amid a flurry of regional diplomacy and intelligence manoeuvring, Libya’s protracted political crisis stands at a critical juncture. A new United States-backed initiative, spearheaded by presidential adviser Massad Boulos, is aiming to dismantle the country’s entrenched institutional divide and unify its executive authorities. The proposal has garnered notable traction among eastern Libyan factions, effectively shifting the onus onto their western counterparts to articulate a clear stance. This development injects a fresh, albeit contentious, dynamic into the long-standing efforts to stabilize the North African nation, which has been plagued by conflict and political fragmentation since the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi.
The US Initiative: A Closer Look
Massad Boulos, the US presidential adviser for Middle Eastern and African affairs, has positioned the American plan as a complementary effort to the ongoing United Nations initiatives, rather than a replacement. The core tenets of the proposal revolve around three critical objectives: the formation of a unified national government, the integration of fragmented state institutions, and the encouragement of American oil investments. The emphasis on oil investments underscores Libya’s immense hydrocarbon wealth, which remains a key strategic interest for international powers and a significant factor in the country’s internal power struggles. While Boulos frames the initiative as a pragmatic pathway to reconciliation, it has ignited intense debate within Libya and among international observers regarding Washington’s capacity to successfully bridge the nation’s traditional divides. Sceptics fear that this plan might merely join a long list of failed settlements that have punctuated Libya’s post-Gaddafi history, offering temporary fixes rather than enduring solutions.
Deep-Rooted Divisions: Libya’s Decade of Turmoil
To fully grasp the significance of the current US initiative, it is crucial to understand the tumultuous decade that has defined Libya since the fall of Gaddafi. The initial optimism of the 2011 revolution quickly devolved into a complex civil war, characterized by the emergence of myriad armed groups, tribal militias, and competing political factions. By 2014, the country was effectively split between two rival governments: the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli, and an eastern-based administration allied with the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, supported by military commander Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA).
The period from 2014 to 2020 saw sporadic but intense fighting, culminating in Haftar’s ambitious 2019 offensive on Tripoli, which sought to unify the country by force. This offensive, backed by foreign powers such as Egypt, the UAE, and Russia, ultimately failed, largely due to robust support for the GNA from Turkey and Qatar. A UN-brokered ceasefire in October 2020 paved the way for the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), which aimed to establish a unified interim government to lead the country to national elections. In March 2021, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, with the mandate to prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections by December 2021. However, these elections were ultimately postponed indefinitely due to disagreements over electoral laws and candidate eligibility, plunging Libya back into political uncertainty and maintaining the executive division. The GNU’s legitimacy has since been challenged by the HoR, which appointed its own prime minister, Fathi Bashagha, leading to a persistent standoff. This backdrop of failed agreements, military stalemates, and institutional paralysis highlights the immense challenges facing any new peace initiative.
A Timeline of Crisis and Attempts at Resolution
- 2011: Fall of Muammar Gaddafi, initial hopes for democratic transition.
- 2014: Second Libyan Civil War erupts; formation of rival governments: the internationally recognized GNA in Tripoli and the eastern-based HoR/LNA alliance.
- December 2015: Signing of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in Skhirat, Morocco, aiming to establish a unified government. The agreement largely failed to be fully implemented.
- April 2019: Khalifa Haftar launches a military offensive to seize Tripoli from the GNA.
- June 2020: Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli collapses; LNA retreats from western Libya.
- October 2020: UN-brokered ceasefire agreement signed in Geneva; initiation of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF).
- March 2021: Formation of the interim Government of National Unity (GNU) under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, tasked with leading the country to elections.
- December 2021: Presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled for this month, are indefinitely postponed due to unresolved legal and political issues.
- February 2022: The eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) appoints Fathi Bashagha as prime minister, challenging the legitimacy of the GNU and deepening the executive divide.
- June 2024: Massad Boulos’s US-backed initiative gains public traction, starting with endorsements from eastern factions.
Eastern Embrace, Western Scrutiny
The political quiet in western Libya was abruptly broken on June 21 when Abdul Hakim Belhaj, a prominent political figure and former commander of the Tripoli Military Council, issued a statement officially backing the US initiative. Belhaj, who currently heads the al-Watan Party, called on the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) to clearly state its position on the proposal. He described the US plan as an "opportunity to accelerate reaching political solutions that end the current state of political division," pragmatically stressing that any settlement under current circumstances must prioritize the "possible and acceptable" over the "perfect but impossible." While Belhaj’s political influence has waned in recent years, his endorsement carries significant symbolic weight in western Libya, given his historical role in the 2011 revolution and subsequent political landscape.
Belhaj’s statement followed weeks of vocal support from eastern-based forces. Military commander Khalifa Haftar, a dominant figure in eastern Libya, and more than 100 members of the eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) had already expressed their backing for the American plan. Aisha al-Tabalqi, a member of the HoR, articulated to Al Jazeera that the US initiative distinguishes itself by relying on an understanding between the two primary factions wielding actual influence on the ground. She noted that the emergence of supportive voices in the West, such as Belhaj’s, could significantly enhance the initiative’s chances of broader acceptance and implementation.
However, the true extent of the initiative’s support, particularly within the HoR, remains contested. Mohammed al-Maazab, a member of the High Council of State (HCS), a legislative body in western Libya, revealed that several HoR members privately informed him their names had been added to the list of supporters without their prior knowledge or consent. This allegation, if true, would cast doubt on the genuine breadth of support for the initiative and suggest a degree of political manipulation. Al-Maazab further dismissed Belhaj’s move as an attempt to "present himself as a party that can be part of any future political arrangements," characterizing it as a "leap in the air that will not significantly affect the balance of power." Such conflicting narratives underscore the deep mistrust and factionalism that continue to impede unified political progress in Libya.
The ‘Deal’ vs. ‘Roadmap’ Debate: Allegations of Dynastic Power-Sharing
The mechanics of the American proposal have faced heavy scrutiny from Libyan analysts who fear the initiative may inadvertently entrench a prolonged power-sharing arrangement among specific individuals rather than paving the way for genuine democratic processes. During a recent episode of Al Jazeera Arabic’s Beyond the News (Ma Wara’ al-Khabar), political analyst Abdulsalam al-Rajhi sharply criticized the effort, arguing it is "closer to a deal than an initiative." Al-Rajhi suggested that Boulos, reportedly lacking extensive diplomatic experience in the region, might be seeking a swift geopolitical victory, potentially at the expense of a truly inclusive and sustainable solution.
A central point of contention revolves around widespread leaks, cited by al-Rajhi, suggesting that the plan is designed around specific individuals with familial ties to current powerbrokers. These leaks allege that the plan aims to install Saddam Haftar – son of eastern commander Khalifa Haftar – as the head of a new Presidential Council, and Ibrahim Dbeibah – nephew of current GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah – as the new prime minister. This alleged "family deal" has drawn significant alarm, as both Saddam Haftar and Ibrahim Dbeibah were heavily implicated in a recent UN Panel of Experts report detailing illicit oil smuggling and financial misappropriation. The report, which monitors sanctions implementation in Libya, often provides granular details on how various factions exploit the country’s resources, including oil, for personal gain, thus perpetuating the conflict. Such accusations fuel fears that the US initiative might inadvertently legitimize individuals with questionable pasts and further entrench a system of cronyism rather than foster transparency and accountability.
Voices of Caution and Support
Conversely, Senussi Ismail, a Tripoli-based political analyst, argued that despite legitimate fears of a dictatorial relapse or the entrenchment of family rule, the current political deadlock necessitates taking calculated risks. "The majority view is that there should be positive engagement with Boulos’s initiative," Ismail stated, emphasizing that the US plan must be seamlessly merged with the existing UN roadmap to ensure legitimacy and broader international buy-in. He stressed that any new unified government emerging from this process must be bound by strict timelines leading directly to presidential and legislative elections, thereby preventing the new authorities from clinging to power indefinitely. This perspective highlights the desperate need for any forward momentum, even if imperfect, given the persistent stagnation.
William Lawrence, a former US diplomat and professor of international affairs, offered a defence of the American engagement, emphasizing its pragmatic focus. "The only path Boulos can work on as a first step is finding economic solutions and unifying Libya’s economic institutions," Lawrence said. He expressed confidence in Boulos’s intentions: "I believe he comes with good intentions and is trying to reach a comprehensive, sustainable solution… I do not see any alternative plan at present." This view suggests that in the absence of a universally accepted political roadmap, an economically driven approach might be the most viable starting point, hoping that shared economic interests can foster political cooperation. The unification of the Central Bank of Libya and the National Oil Corporation, for example, has been a long-standing goal of international efforts, seen as crucial for transparent revenue management and equitable resource distribution.
The Geopolitical Chessboard: Regional Engagements
The debate over the US initiative is unfolding against a backdrop of intense regional mobilization, underscoring the complex web of foreign interests in Libya. Last week, foreign ministers from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkiye met with Boulos in Cairo to discuss the Libyan file, signaling a concerted regional effort to shape the country’s future. These nations have historically supported different factions within Libya, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia generally backing Haftar and the eastern administration, while Turkey has been a staunch ally of the Tripoli-based governments. Their joint engagement with the US adviser suggests a potential shift towards a more unified regional approach, or at least a coordinated dialogue, aimed at finding common ground.
Simultaneously, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the formation of a new "R-4" regional mechanism, comprising Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkiye, aimed at supporting regional stability. While not exclusively focused on Libya, this alliance could play a role in influencing outcomes given the member states’ direct or indirect involvement in Libyan affairs. This diplomatic push has been matched by notable intelligence activities on the ground in Libya, indicating a heightened level of covert engagement and strategic positioning by various international actors. These parallel movements, according to Faisal Bwalraiga, a national security researcher, reflect an international effort to cultivate an environment conducive to new political arrangements, whether through overt diplomacy or subtle pressure. "Libya is currently moving between two possibilities: reaching a new political settlement, or rearranging the balance of power between the different parties," Bwalraiga noted, highlighting the precarious nature of the current moment. He added that Washington views its initiative as a lever to support the UN track, rather than a replacement for it, suggesting a strategic alignment rather than a unilateral pivot.
Libya’s Economic Lifeline: Oil and Stability
Libya possesses Africa’s largest proven oil reserves, and its oil wealth has historically been both a blessing and a curse. The struggle for control over oil fields, pipelines, and export terminals has been a major driver of conflict, with revenues often diverted to fund militias and political factions rather than benefit the populace. The US initiative’s focus on encouraging American oil investments is therefore highly significant. For Washington, stable oil production and transparent revenue management are critical, not just for Libya’s economic recovery but also for global energy markets. The integration of state economic institutions, particularly the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), is paramount. Currently, both institutions grapple with internal divisions and external pressures, hindering their ability to function effectively as unified national entities. A unified government that can credibly oversee these institutions and ensure equitable distribution of oil revenues could remove a major source of conflict and foster a sense of shared national interest. However, the legacy of illicit oil smuggling, as highlighted by the UN Panel of Experts, remains a significant challenge, requiring robust oversight and accountability mechanisms.
The GNU’s Deliberate Silence and Future Pathways
For now, the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) has not issued a formal position on the US plan. Elias al-Barouni, a political analyst, suggested that the government’s caution is calculated. This strategic reticence is likely aimed at preserving political manoeuvring space, avoiding divisions within the Western camp that supports the GNU, and critically, waiting for Washington’s final stance to crystallize. The GNU faces immense pressure from various internal and external actors, and any misstep could undermine its already fragile legitimacy. By remaining silent, it can observe the evolving dynamics, assess the true level of international consensus, and potentially position itself to extract concessions or ensure its own survival in any new arrangement.
The current US initiative represents a pivotal moment for Libya. Its success hinges on its ability to overcome deep-seated mistrust, reconcile competing interests, and avoid the pitfalls of previous failed peace efforts. Whether it ultimately becomes a genuine roadmap to stability and democratic elections or merely another temporary "deal" that entrenches a new power elite remains to be seen. The coming weeks will likely reveal the true extent of its acceptance, particularly from the GNU and its allies in western Libya, and determine whether this American push can finally break Libya’s decade-long cycle of crisis. The outcome will not only shape Libya’s future but also test the efficacy of international mediation in deeply fractured states.
