The architecture of international climate policy, painstakingly constructed over three decades, is facing an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy as global temperatures consistently breach the 1.5-degree Celsius threshold. Jessica Green, a leading researcher at the University of Toronto and author of the influential book Existential Politics: Why Global Climate Institutions Are Failing and How to Fix Them, argues that the dominant paradigm of "managing tons"—a strategy centered on carbon pricing, cap-and-trade systems, and offsets—has fundamentally failed to decelerate the climate crisis. Instead of fostering a rapid transition, these market-based tools have often served to entrench the existing fossil fuel economy while shielding asset owners from the necessary political and economic consequences of their production models.
As the world grapples with the fallout of overshooting critical warming targets, Green’s call for a "reckoning" suggests that the era of viewing climate change as a sequestered environmental issue, or "low politics," has ended. In its place, climate policy is being subsumed into the realm of "high politics," where it is inextricably linked to national security, trade wars, and the securing of critical mineral supply chains. This shift represents a move away from the voluntary, target-based aspirations of the Paris Agreement toward a more aggressive form of economic statecraft.
A Chronology of Institutional Failure: From Rio to Paris
To understand the current impasse, it is necessary to trace the timeline of global climate governance, which has been characterized by a series of high-profile agreements that have largely failed to produce a measurable decline in global emissions. The journey began in 1992 with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Rio Earth Summit. This established the "Conference of the Parties" (COP) framework, which Green now argues has become bloated and ineffective, collapsing under the weight of its own administrative complexity.
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol attempted to introduce legally binding emission reduction targets for developed nations. However, the protocol was hampered by the non-participation of the United States and the eventual withdrawal of countries like Canada during its second commitment period. By the time the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015, the strategy had shifted to "Nationally Determined Contributions" (NDCs)—voluntary pledges that allowed countries to set their own goals.
Despite the diplomatic triumph of the Paris Agreement, the implementation has been lackluster. In 2023, many parties failed to submit their updated NDCs on time, signaling a waning appetite for the multilateral process. Green points out that while the Paris Agreement is legally binding in its procedural requirements, it lacks the enforcement mechanisms to address the underlying domestic political issues—specifically, what to do with the trillions of dollars in fossil fuel assets and the powerful interests that own them.
The Failure of "Managing Tons" and the Offset Mirage
Central to Green’s critique is the concept of "managing tons." For decades, economists have championed carbon pricing as the most efficient way to reduce emissions. The theory suggests that by putting a price on carbon, the market will naturally shift toward cleaner alternatives. However, Green argues that the political reality has rendered this tool ineffective. In many jurisdictions, the price required to actually drive a total transition—estimated by some experts to be as high as $1,000 per tonne—is politically impossible to implement, as it would cause immediate and severe economic disruption.
This has led to the rise of carbon offsets, a mechanism born from the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. Offsets allow polluters to continue emitting by funding projects that supposedly reduce emissions elsewhere, such as reforestation or renewable energy projects in developing nations. Green asserts that these markets have become an "exercise in obfuscation." The complexity of calculating "additionality"—whether a project would have happened anyway without the offset funding—allows for significant "fudging" of numbers.
Data from recent years supports this skepticism. Investigations into major carbon credit certifiers have suggested that a vast majority of rainforest carbon offsets are "phantom credits" that do not represent real carbon reductions. Green argues that while these projects might provide some limited finance to developing countries, they do not provide the massive capital injection required for true decarbonization. Instead, they provide "political cover" for large emitters to claim progress while maintaining business-as-usual operations.
Radical Pragmatism: A New Policy Framework
In response to these failures, Green proposes a framework she calls "radical pragmatism." This approach is "radical" because it seeks to address the root of the problem: the political power and profitability of fossil fuel production. It is "pragmatic" because it does not wait for the total dismantling of global capitalism—a task for which there is no remaining time on the climate clock—but rather uses existing institutional levers to rein in capital.
Radical pragmatism involves several key shifts in policy:
- Supply-Side Intervention: Moving away from just taxing consumption to actively making it riskier and more expensive to produce fossil fuels.
- Reducing Political Power: Implementing policies that diminish the influence of fossil fuel asset owners over the legislative process.
- Institutional Rejiggering: Using trade law, security policy, and financial regulation to favor green technology over carbon-intensive industry.
Green notes that the transition is already being felt through "existential dread" in the middle class, as the reorganization of economic structures impacts pensions, real estate, and future stability. To be effective, climate policy must "connect the dots" between these personal anxieties and the broader energy transition, rather than hiding behind complex industrial carbon pricing models that alienate the public.
The Role of the Private Sector and Carbon Removal
A significant point of contention in the current climate debate is the role of the fossil fuel industry in the transition, particularly regarding carbon-dioxide removal (CDR). As the world overshoots 1.5°C, CDR has become a scientific necessity, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). However, Green warns against allowing the fossil fuel industry to lead these efforts.
There is a fundamental conflict of interest when private-sector actors, whose profits depend on continued extraction, are tasked with providing a public good like carbon removal. Green draws a parallel to healthcare, where profit motives can often lead to outcomes that benefit shareholders at the expense of public health. In the Canadian context, where residual emissions—those that are hardest to abate—account for roughly 20% of the total, the question of who pays for and controls removal technology is paramount. Green suggests that leaving these decisions to major oil and gas firms like Suncor is a "recipe for failure."
Geopolitical Implications and the Shift to High Politics
The "reckoning" Green describes is already manifesting in the way global powers approach climate change. It is no longer just about environmental stewardship; it is about "economic statecraft." The United States’ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) are examples of climate policy being used as industrial policy. These measures are designed to secure domestic supply chains for minerals like lithium and cobalt, which are essential for the energy transition, while penalizing trading partners with lower environmental standards.
This shift suggests that the future of climate governance may lie less in the massive, consensus-driven COP summits and more in "minilateral" agreements among powerful economic blocs. While this may be more effective at driving investment, Green warns that it may not be the most "productive or efficient" way to manage a global crisis, as it risks leaving behind developing nations that lack the capital to compete in a green subsidies race.
Conclusion: Tipping Points and the Path Forward
Despite the grim assessment of the last thirty years of policy, there are signs of non-linear progress. Technology adoption for solar, wind, and electric vehicles is increasing at rates that frequently outpace projections. Green suggests that while the transition is currently following a linear path, the world is approaching "tipping points"—both ecological and sociotechnical.
The failure of the "managing tons" approach has cleared the way for a more honest discussion about the political and economic barriers to a zero-carbon world. The reckoning involves acknowledging that climate change is an existential threat to the current political order, necessitating a radical shift in how governments manage fossil capital. As Green emphasizes, the time for "papering over" the distribution conflicts of the energy transition has passed. The path forward requires a pragmatic but aggressive dismantling of the protections that have historically facilitated fossil fuel extraction, ensuring that the transition is driven by public good rather than the preservation of legacy assets.
