Corporate enforcement actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) have seen a noticeable decline, a trend that legal experts suggest signals a more selective approach by the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, this does not indicate a broader relaxation of vigilance for international businesses. Instead, enforcement efforts are increasingly concentrating on export controls and economic sanctions, areas where international business operations, particularly those involving third parties, continue to present significant risks. Thad McBride of Bass Berry & Sims highlights that while third parties remain a primary source of risk, the DOJ’s emphasis on voluntary disclosure has made it a compelling option for companies facing violations.
For decades, the United States has vigorously enforced the FCPA, a landmark piece of legislation designed to prohibit the bribery of foreign government officials by U.S. entities and individuals. However, since the early months of 2025, the enforcement landscape has appeared less active in terms of corporate FCPA cases. A review of the DOJ’s corporate FCPA enforcement page reveals a single corporate enforcement action for 2026: a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with Scoular in July, the month the page was last updated. Furthermore, in March 2026, the DOJ announced its decision not to prosecute the French medical device company Balt SAS, following the company’s voluntary self-disclosure of misconduct.
This does not signify the disappearance of FCPA enforcement. The statute remains firmly in place, and the government continues to pursue individual prosecutions. However, the regulated community can anticipate a more focused and selective enforcement strategy. Concurrently, businesses operating internationally should not interpret a decrease in corporate FCPA cases as an indication of diminished overall compliance risk. Both the Departments of Commerce and Treasury have been actively pursuing significant cases involving export controls and sanctions, frequently involving foreign subsidiaries, distributors, brokers, and other intermediaries – precisely the types of parties that historically generate anti-corruption risks.
A Narrower FCPA Enforcement Agenda Emerges
The shift in enforcement priorities became more apparent in February 2025 when President Donald Trump directed the DOJ to pause new FCPA investigations and conduct a thorough review of existing matters. This directive was followed in June 2025 by the issuance of new FCPA enforcement guidelines. These guidelines instructed prosecutors to prioritize cases that involve cartels and transnational criminal organizations; demonstrable harm to identifiable U.S. companies; national security concerns; and serious misconduct characterized by substantial bribes, concealment, fraud, or obstruction.
The Scoular matter, resolved in July 2026, serves as a practical illustration of this new policy in action. According to the DOJ’s announcement of the resolution, Scoular, an agricultural company, utilized third-party customs brokers between 2013 and 2019 to facilitate payments exceeding $400,000 in bribes to Mexican officials. These payments were intended to circumvent inspection requirements for shipments crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. The brokers allegedly disguised these bribe payments by invoicing Scoular as "reinspection" charges, thereby enabling the company to avoid more than $6.5 million in fees and costs.
The DOJ underscored that a portion of the bribe money ultimately benefited individuals associated with cartel operations, even though Scoular personnel were reportedly unaware of this connection. Scoular agreed to pay over $10 million in criminal penalties and entered into a three-year DPA. Under the terms of the agreement, Scoular is obligated to maintain full cooperation with the DOJ, implement and uphold an enhanced compliance and ethics program, and submit periodic reports to the DOJ detailing its remediation and compliance efforts. The department granted Scoular a 25% reduction from the lower end of the applicable sentencing guidelines range, acknowledging its cooperation and remediation. However, the company did not receive credit for voluntary disclosure, as it failed to self-report the misconduct.
The circumstances of the Scoular case align closely with the DOJ’s stated priority of targeting cartel activity. The matter also highlighted other areas of emphasis for the administration: regular payments concealed through third-party invoices and shipments crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, a critical concern for the current administration.
Limited Corporate FCPA Cases, But Robust Cross-Border Enforcement Continues
Looking ahead, legal observers anticipate a continued limited prosecution of corporate FCPA matters, with the DOJ focusing its resources on cases that align with its stated priorities. This reduced corporate case volume, however, does not equate to a diminished risk for individuals. The DOJ’s ongoing prosecution of individuals demonstrates that personal exposure to FCPA violations remains a significant concern.
Simultaneously, broader cross-border enforcement initiatives are proving to be robust. The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), responsible for administering U.S. commercial export controls, continues to announce significant export control settlements. The BIS’s public export enforcement page lists 11 administrative orders issued thus far in 2026, with penalties that can be substantial.
A notable example occurred in February 2026 when Applied Materials and its Korean subsidiary, Applied Materials Korea, agreed to pay approximately $252 million to the BIS. This settlement resolved allegations concerning the unlawful shipment of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to an entity listed in China. Under U.S. regulations, an export license is mandatory for the export or even in-country transfer of almost any U.S.-origin item to a party on the entity list. The BIS stated that the penalty represented twice the value of the transactions. As part of the resolution, the company is required to conduct multiple compliance audits, supported by annual compliance certifications.
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which oversees and enforces U.S. economic and trade sanctions programs, has also maintained a high level of activity. In February 2026, IMG Academy agreed to pay $1.72 million to resolve apparent counternarcotics sanctions violations. These violations stemmed from tuition agreements and related payments involving two sanctioned individuals linked to a Mexican drug cartel. This case underscores how sanctions risk can emerge even in industries not traditionally perceived as high-risk, particularly for businesses with international customers, payment flows, or other cross-border relationships. The case also reflects the broader U.S. government effort to target activities connected to drug cartels.
These cases are significant because compliance risks rarely operate in isolation. A customs broker, freight forwarder, distributor, or sales agent can simultaneously create exposure related to anti-corruption, sanctions, export controls, and customs regulations within a single transaction. A situation initially perceived as primarily a sanctions issue might later reveal underlying bribery concerns, and vice versa. The Scoular case exemplifies this interconnectedness: the bribery scheme was facilitated through customs brokers. Their legitimate function placed them in regular contact with government officials at the border, and the payments made to these officials ultimately benefited cartel operations.
Vigilant Third-Party Due Diligence and Robust Contractual Protections
While this may seem like a reiteration of well-established principles, the critical role of third parties in triggering liability cannot be overstated and bears repeating. Due diligence must be an ongoing and dynamic process, regularly refreshed based on evolving risk assessments, rather than a static, one-time onboarding exercise.
A more effective approach is to view due diligence as a form of continuous vigilance. This involves constant monitoring of business relationships, including through audits and payment testing. Such testing should focus on identifying vague or unusual charges, such as "reinspection," "facilitation," "handling," "expediting," "administrative," or "special" fees that lack supporting documentation. Payments in round numbers, such as unexplained charges of $100 or $250, also warrant scrutiny. Companies should endeavor to compare invoices against customs records, official government fee schedules, and proof of payment whenever feasible.
Contracts should be meticulously drafted to grant companies clear termination rights and mandate that third parties adhere to all applicable anti-corruption, sanctions, and export control laws. Companies may also consider providing compliance training to higher-risk third parties, taking into account their geographical location and the nature of the services they provide. Foreign third parties may not always be fully aware of the applicability of U.S. law to their conduct. They might operate in markets where informal payments are common or mistakenly believe that a decrease in FCPA enforcement actions signifies a reduction in enforcement risk. Additional contractual safeguards, such as the right to audit or requiring intermediaries to provide detailed activity reports with each payment request, should also be carefully considered.
Voluntary Disclosure: The Clearest Path to Optimal Resolution
The DOJ’s department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP), implemented in March 2026, offers companies substantial advantages for voluntarily disclosing potential misconduct. Under Part I of the CEP, the DOJ commits to declining prosecution when a company voluntarily self-discloses misconduct to the appropriate DOJ criminal component, fully cooperates with the investigation, timely and appropriately remediates the harm, and has no disqualifying aggravating circumstances. Even in the presence of aggravating factors, prosecutors retain discretion to recommend a declination. Companies may still be required to disgorge ill-gotten gains, forfeit assets, or provide restitution or victim compensation.
The CEP also outlines benefits for companies that narrowly miss qualifying for a declination. When a company self-reports in good faith but its report does not meet all of the DOJ’s voluntary self-disclosure requirements, or when aggravating factors support a criminal resolution, the DOJ typically offers a non-prosecution agreement. Such agreements generally involve a term of fewer than three years, the absence of an independent monitor, and a reduction of 50% to 75% from the low end of the applicable U.S. sentencing guidelines fine range.
The advantages of the CEP became evident shortly after its publication. Only a few days later, the DOJ declined to prosecute Balt SAS under the policy. The medical device company had voluntarily disclosed a long-standing bribery scheme in which a consultant channeled payments to a senior doctor at a state-owned hospital in France. These payments were made in exchange for the hospital purchasing Balt products. According to the DOJ, the payments were disguised as consulting fees and bonuses and concealed through sham consulting agreements, fraudulent invoices, and the use of personal email accounts.
As a direct result of Balt’s voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and remediation efforts, the DOJ declined prosecution, although the company was required to disgorge approximately $1.2 million. Separately, the DOJ has charged a former Balt USA executive and the company’s Belgium-based consultant with FCPA and money-laundering offenses related to the alleged scheme. These individual cases remain pending.
The contrast between the Balt and Scoular resolutions is instructive, even though the underlying facts differ. Scoular did not receive credit for voluntary disclosure. While the DOJ acknowledged its cooperation and remediation, Scoular entered into a three-year DPA and received only a 25% reduction from the bottom of the applicable guidelines range. Balt, in contrast, achieved a declination.
The CEP also places a significant premium on speed. A disclosure generally must occur before there is an "imminent threat" of the government discovering the misconduct and within a reasonably prompt timeframe after the company becomes aware of it. Notably, the CEP provides a limited exception for internal whistleblower reports. If a whistleblower reports misconduct both internally and to the DOJ, the company may still qualify for a declination even if the whistleblower reports to the DOJ first. This is permissible provided the company investigates the allegations and self-reports the conduct as soon as reasonably practicable, but no later than 120 days after receiving the whistleblower’s internal report. This provision offers companies a limited window to assess whistleblower allegations before engaging with the DOJ, though the CEP does not mandate or imply waiting until an internal investigation is fully concluded.
It is crucial to recognize that not every potential violation necessitates an automatic disclosure. Companies still need to conduct sufficient investigation to understand the nature of the conduct, assess jurisdictional reach, and evaluate potential parallel regulatory exposures. However, prompt action is paramount. Legal and compliance teams should establish clear escalation protocols to facilitate the rapid identification of potentially criminal conduct, ensure the preservation of evidence, and enable informed disclosure decisions before the most significant incentives for cooperation diminish.
Tris Sebesta contributed to this report.
